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To speak effectively, plainly, and shortly, it becometh the gravity of the profession.
- Sir Edward Coke, 1600

Plain English Statutes and Readability
By Reed Dickerson

Part 1- History, the Problem and the Case for a Statute
In 1965 Reed Dickerson, Professor
of Law at the University of Indiana Law
School, wrote the classic Fundamentals
of Legal Drafting, published by Little
Brown and Co., Boston, a book that has
become the most referredto of all books
on legal drafting. Little Brown and Co.
will soon be publishingProfessorDickerson's Second Edition of Fundamentals
of Legal Drafting. With the permission
of the author and the publishers, the
Michigan Bar Journal and the PlainEnglish Committee are pleased to present
excerpts from a chapter in the Second
Edition regardingplain English statutes
and readability.
1
A Bit of History

Although it is hard to say when the
complaints against legal language began, outrage is hardly new. Legal prolixity came under fire as early as 1566.2
Thomas Jefferson took up the cudgel in
1778. 3 Jeremy Bentham fumed about
legislative lonq-windedness early in the
19th century. Fred Rodell, writing in
1939, said, "Almost all legal sentences ... have a way of reading as
though they had been translated from
the German by someone with a rather
meager knowledge of English."'
The modem push for clear readable
legal instruments began in the early
1940's following Congressman Maury
Maverick's coinage of "gobbledygook"
and the Office of Price Administration's
first attempts to impose price controls at
the beginning of World War 1I.Finding
that America's small businessmen could
not understand Its regulations without

the intervention of lawyers, OPA engaged Professor David F. Cavers of the
Harvard Law School and Rudolf Flesch
to help the agency communicate more
effectively with the people whose prices
it regulated.
From OPA's experience came a
body of expertise useful in simplifying
regulations and statutes. 6 This was improved during the Pentagon's ten-year
post-World War II recodification of the
Nation's military laws 7 and later during
the Federal Aviation Agency's recodification, in the early 1960's, of the vast
accumulation of regulations relating to
aircraft. Indeed, this expertise, since refined and extended to private legal instruments remains useful, even today.
Despite these developments, the
public visibility of the movement to
simplify faded with the war pressures
that supported price control. The resulting public passivity went undisturbed,
even by the Korean and Vietnamese
wars, until the explosion of the consumer
movement, which in the early 1970's
turned its attention to instruments that
the typical consumers of goods and services are being persuaded to accept: insurance policies, product warranties,
and credit documents. At the same time,
many small, relatively unsophisticated
businessmen were being subjected to a
barrage of detailed regulations from
agencies such as the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration and
the Environmental Protection Agency.
As a result, public pressure to simplify
legal instruments became even greater
than it was during World War II.
Mandating Plain English: First Efforts
The most dramatic development in
the drive to simplify the language of private legal instruments came with the
emergence of the "plain English" movement. The first glimmerings came in
1974, when Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. and Sentry Life Insurance Co.
introduced simplified automobile insurance policies, and in 1975, when
Citibank and First National Bank of
Boston introduced simplified consumer
loan arrangements. 8 The first week in
February, 1977 saw the introduction of
the Sullivan Bill in New York which became law the following year, and President Carter's television "fireside chat"
(replete with rocking chair and cardigan
sweater), which culminated in an executive order that required plain English in
government regulations.
The first efforts to legislate "plain
language" show widely differing approaches. New York's Sullivan law,
brain child of a Citicorp lawyer, Duncan
A. MacDonald, protects "consumer" instruments, which are defined as residen-
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present context. A more useful guideline bolizes the current public distaste for inappears in the Employee Retirement In- eptly crafted laws, regulations, and concome Security Program: "The summary sumer instruments, and the failure of the
plan shall be written in a manner calcu- legal profession to keep abreast of modlated to be understood by the average ern planning needs. Although the Bar is
beginning to wake up (along with some
plan participant."
Stating the Problem
What is the best way to solve the
problem? First, we have to understand
it. This involves, among other things,
knowing how lawyers got into this mess.
The traditional explanation has been
that every discipline needs its own technical terms, some of which may be
meaningless to outsiders. It is also true
that many legal terms have perfectly
adequate "plain English" equivalents
and some matters need not be as complicated as they at first seem. Here, a
good case for simplification can be
made.

tial leases or contracts for money, property, or services for "personal, family, or
household purposes" and involve
$50,000 or less. The mandated standard
is "plain language," defined as language
"written in a clear and coherent manner
using words with common and everyday
meanings," and "[aippropriately divided and captioned." In case of noncompliance, the consumer is entitled to
actual damages and a civil penalty of
$50, but not attorneys' fees or court
costs. Defenses include good faith and
full performance. The Attorney General
may bring an action for an injunction or
restitution. Other states have followed
suit.
The Federal government has set a
few, very general standards of clarity and
readability. Under the Consumer Product Warranty Act, for example, the Federal Trade Commission has, by regulation, required that written consumer
product warranties set forth specified
items of information "in simple and
readily understood language." The
Truth in Lending Act and its supplementary Regulation Z require that the disclosures required by that Act be made
"clearly and conspicuously." Neither of
these examples has much to offer in the

Unfortunately, drafting tradition retains the heavy flavor of now-extinct
conditions that prevailed for a long
period beginning in 1487, when drafting
by the judiciary ended.
Legislative gobbledygook apparently reached its peak in the eighteenth
century, a peak so high that even the
massive statutory reforms that Bentham
generated early in the nineteenth century have not succeeded in leveling it.
As a consequence, lawyers have
long been enmeshed in an accumulation
of outworn forms that they have been
reluctant to revise if the forms have been
adjudicated in court, and unable to revise if they do not understand them,
which is often the case. A thorough purging of offending forms would be a happy
event.
But do we need a law?
The Case for a Statute
The idea of legislating the specifics
of good writing is, for professional
draftsmen, highly repugnant and not
merely because most of the people who
have been writing these laws have failed
to get an adequate handle on the principles of clear communication. It is desirable not to tie the hands of draftsmen
who need elbow room.
A normal first reaction to the Sullivan law was that, while a minor political
miracle, it was naive, inadequately
framed, and unenforceable. Many members of the Bar still think so. But they
may be missing the main point. Despite
its weaknesses, it dramatically sym-

law schools), the pace has until recently
been glacial.
The main value of the plain English
laws appears to be symbolic. Although
New York's Sullivan law is probably (in
any serious sense) unenforceable because of its "good faith" defense (most
bad draftsmen operate in good faith),
the results that it seems to have helped
to produce in that state are impressive.
Decently readable insurance policies
and warranties are now common.
To accelerate this trend, the organized bar (and indirectly the law
schools) needs a similar legislative jolt in
other states, which can be delivered
without seriously compromising the
principles of good draftsmanship. Because a highly developed expertise for
simplifying legal instruments already
exists, it is time that it be put to more
effective use.
And so, a modest case can be made
for a law to help the legal profession
overcome its present, partly justifiable
inertia. Without it, the organized bar is
unlikely to initiate effective action to improve the clarity and readability of legal
instruments.
Some Reservations
One problem is that the "plain English" ideal, if not carefully focused, can
be seriously off the mark. "Plain English"
is in many legal contexts anything but
plain. Besides, the concept suggests that
there is an ideal way to say things that
will fit all legal audiences.
Because legal audiences differ
widely, the draftsman should be permitted to adjust his focus accordingly. On
the other hand, no great harm is involved if such a law focuses solely on
professionals who deal with unsophisticated consumers, where mandating a
higher level of understandability makes
some sense. It makes less sense if the
effort isspread over a wider base within
which audiences differ materially.
Judge Harold Leventhal's observation that simplifying private instruments
would make it harder to charge what
they are worth' 0 is relevant but not persuasive. His explanation too readily becomes an excuse for the status quo,

which is deplorable. The answer is that
in most cases the matter can be handled
by educating the client, preferably in advance, about what is involved. This will
head off most of the unpleasant surprises.

in plain English. The importance of irreplaceability is hard to avoid.
What we are really concerned with
in legal drafting isotherwise apt, but generally unfamiliar, language for which no
familiar language is a suitable substitute.
This may mean suitable in law or suitable
in fact. As an example of the former, the
law might permit only one way of expressing an idea. A classic example is
D'Arundel's case, 14 which held that if a
person wanted to convey land in fee simple, he had to say "to A and his heirs."
No substitute, no matter how clearly
synonymous, would do.
A modern counterpart is Section 3104(1)(d) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which provides that to be negotiable, a note must "be payable to order
or to bearer." This means that it must
say "order" or "bearer." Although modern law contains little of this kind of mandated legal suitability, the draftsman
must remain alert to the danger.

Act shows that the danger of "information overload" is a real one.
In any event, technical terms are
not the main source of trouble. As Janice
Redish has pointed out, "The complexity of the sentence structure is a much
greater barrier to understanding...
than the technical vocabulary."'" U

What about factual suitability?
Here, we are talking about a term that
refers to a body of law and for which
there is no useable substitute with equivalent legal connotations. Examples are
"surrender" (of a lease), "merchantable," "unconscionable," and "venue."
Until a suitable synonym appears, there
is no practicable alternative to using the
accepted term or perhaps creating equivalence by express definition. Example:
"In this policy, the term 'legal cause'
lar ... department of knowledge"), but means proximate cause." Here, it is safe
it is not. Because "specific" is closer to to use "legal cause" throughout the rest
"special" than to "precision" and "sig- of the instrument without losing the
nification" refers, not to the concept, but benefit of the established legal connotato the relation between it and its tech- tions of "proximate cause." Unfortunical name, the gist of "term of art" nately, in this instance, the definition
would seem to be its uniqueness for would not be very helpful. In many
practical use.
cases, the only other acceptable alternaIronically, Mellinkoff supports this tive is a supplementary explanation or
view of semantic precision by many of referral to a lawyer.
his own examples. "Laches," "comIn any event, the outer limits of
parative negligence," "merchantable," "term of art" need not concern us. In"tort," and "stare decisis," which he lists deed, it is unnecessary even to refer to
as legitimate "terms of art," are all highly the concept. The important thing is that
general and highly vague. 12 Precision is the instances in which the draftsman has
not the problem. The problem is irre- no legal or practicable choice as to how
placeability: To what extent is the something may be effectively stated are
draftsman stuck with technical legal few enough to leave him considerable
terms that are unfamiliar to the general opportunity to simplify or otherwise impublic? Mellinkoff associates terms of art prove the language of legal documents.
with irreplaceability in his questionable As for the unavoidable terms, he always
contention that the greater its precision has the option of adding explanatory
("sharpness") the greater the chance material if he believes that it would be
that a term "has no synonym in ordinary helpful and not unduly cumbersome.
English."',3 Many of his non-specific Experience with the Securities Act of
terms of art likewise have no equivalent 1933 and the recent Truth in Lending

ment In Standardized and Prefabricated Law,
13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 90 (1945); Conard,

Terms of Art
Another basis for skepticism has
been the generally acknowledged necessity of honoring legal "terms of art." This
is a problem for a legal term only ifthere
is no usable replacement.
What is a legal "term of art?" Mellinkoff says that it is a "technical word
with a specific meaning."" 1 A technical
meaning, of course, is likely to be unfamiliar to the general public. But the
determining factor, he says, is "specificity," which he equates with "precision."
But if unique aptness is not the determining factor, where is the problem?
IfMellinkoff is right, the concept of "term
of art" is here irrelevant. Semantic precision is not the ultimate, or even main
goal in drafting, and its presence does
not guarantee suitability. The appropriate measure of aptness is, rather, the
draftsman's substantive mission, for
which generality and even vagueness
are often preferable. The Sherman Act
is the classic example.
Mellinkoff's definition of "term of
art" may look like a paraphrase of the
definition in Webster's Third InternationalDictionary ("a word or phrase having a specific signification in a particu-
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